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TPP, RCEP and the Future 
of Copyright Norm-setting 
in the Asian Pacific
Peter K Yu1
1 Introduction
The past decade has seen two mega-regional intellectual property 
norm-setting exercises focusing on countries in the Asian Pacific region. 
The first was part of the effort to establish the Trans-Pacific Partnership2 
(TPP), a mega-regional pact that was intended to cover ‘40% of global 
GDP [gross domestic product] and some 30% of worldwide trade in 
both goods and services’.3 The negotiations surrounding this partnership 
ran from 15  March 2010 until the signing of the final agreement on 
4  February 2016. In January 2017, shortly after the inauguration of 
the Trump Administration, the United States withdrew from the TPP, 
1  Copyright © 2018 Peter K Yu. Professor of Law, Professor of Communication and Director, 
Center for Law and Intellectual Property, Texas A&M University. An earlier version of this chapter 
was delivered as the keynote opening address at the 2016 Meeting of the Asian Pacific Copyright 
Association at the Faculty of Law of the University of Hong Kong. The author is grateful to 
the participants for valuable comments and suggestions. The chapter draws on research from the 
author’s earlier articles in the SMU Science and Technology Law Review and the Vanderbilt Journal 
of Transnational Law.
2  Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (signed 4 February 2016) [TPP Agreement].
3  David A Gantz ‘The TPP and RCEP: Mega-Trade Agreements for the Pacific Rim’ (2016) 33 
Ariz J Int’l & Comp L 57 at 59.
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thereby placing the regional pact on life support.4 A year later, however, 
the 11  remaining TPP partners established the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which 
they eventually signed in March 2018. If this modified pact enters into 
force, it will cover Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam.
The second norm-setting exercise is part of the ongoing negotiations 
surrounding the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). 
Launched in November 2012, these negotiations built on past trade and 
non-trade discussions between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN)5 and its six major Asian Pacific neighbours (Australia, China, 
India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea). Although policymakers, 
commentators and the media have seldom analysed the RCEP until 
a few years ago, its 16 negotiating parties ‘account for almost half of the 
world’s population, almost 30 per cent of global GDP and over a quarter 
of world exports’.6 Once established, this partnership will cover not only 
China and India but also two high-income Asian economies (Japan and 
South Korea) and six other TPP/CPTPP partners (Australia, Brunei 
Darussalam, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam).
Taken together, these two mega-regional norm-setting exercises will have 
unlimited potential to shape future copyright norms in the Asian Pacific 
region. For countries that have joined either the CPTPP or the RCEP, 
legal obligations concerning new protection and enforcement standards 
will have to be incorporated into domestic law once the applicable 
agreement enters into force. These standards can be quite burdensome, as 
they often exceed what is currently required by the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO).7 Countries that have joined both 
the CPTPP and the RCEP will also have to be ready to resolve conflicts 
between these two agreements, should they arise.
4  Peter K Yu ‘Thinking about the Trans-Pacific Partnership (and a Mega-regional Agreement on 
Life Support)’ (2017) 20 SMU Sci & Tech L Rev 97.
5  The 10 current members are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. They negotiate as a bloc in the RCEP 
negotiations.
6  ‘Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership’ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(Australia) dfat.gov.au.
7  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1869 UNTS 299 (adopted 
15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) [TRIPS Agreement].
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Even those countries that remain outside of the CPTPP or the RCEP may 
end up accepting norms enshrined in either agreement, or both, despite 
their lack of legal obligation to do so. While some of these countries may 
introduce new laws or amendments in an effort to harmonise their laws 
with those of their Asian Pacific neighbours, others, especially the less 
powerful ones, may face considerable external pressure to accept higher 
standards stipulated in the new mega-regional agreements.
Moreover, if an Asian Pacific Copyright Code is to be developed – 
a recurring theme of this volume – such development will have to take 
into account the new copyright norms in the CPTPP and the RCEP, 
regardless of whether the Code incorporates any of these norms in the 
end. Any effort to develop such a regional code will also have to anticipate 
the potential inconsistencies, tensions and conflicts between the CPTPP 
and the RCEP in the intellectual property area.
In view of these complications and the potentially considerable change 
in the intellectual property norm-setting landscape in the Asian Pacific 
region, this chapter closely examines the roles of the (now inoperative) 
TPP,  the CPTPP and the RCEP in shaping future regional copyright 
norms. It begins by discussing the historical origins of the TPP and the 
RCEP. It then highlights the similarities and differences between the 
copyright and intellectual property enforcement provisions in the TPP 
Agreement and a leaked draft of the RCEP intellectual property chapter. 
This chapter continues to explore the ramifications for the United States’ 
withdrawal from the TPP and the eventual adoption of the CPTPP.8 
It  concludes by outlining the future of copyright norm-setting in the 
Asian Pacific region.
8  Donald J Trump ‘Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Negotiations and Agreement’ (2017) 82 Fed Reg 8497 [Presidential Memorandum].




The origin of the TPP Agreement can be traced back to the early 2000s. 
The predecessor of this agreement was a quadrilateral agreement known 
as the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, more 
commonly referred to as the ‘P4’ or ‘Pacific 4’. As Meredith Lewis 
recounted:9
[The negotiations were initially] launched by Chile, New Zealand and 
Singapore at the APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum] 
leaders’ summit in 2002. These original negotiations contemplated 
an agreement amongst the three participating countries, to be known as 
the Pacific Three Closer Economic Partnership  … . However, Brunei 
attended a number of rounds as an observer, and ultimately joined 
the Agreement as a ‘founding member’. The Agreement was signed by 
New Zealand, Chile and Singapore on July 18, 2005 and by Brunei on 
August 2, 2005, following the conclusion of negotiations in June 2005.
In March 2010, negotiations for an expanded agreement began between 
Australia, Peru, Vietnam, the United States and the P4 members. Malaysia, 
Mexico, Canada and Japan joined the negotiations afterwards.
From its inception, the TPP was negotiated as a highly ambitious 
and comprehensive trade agreement. As the then United States Trade 
Representative (USTR), Ronald Kirk, declared at the first round of the 
TPP negotiations in Melbourne, Australia:10
Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations offer a unique opportunity to shape 
a high-standard, broad-based regional pact. In line with the President’s 
goal of supporting two million additional American jobs through exports, 
a robust TPP agreement would expand our exports to one of the world’s 
fastest-growing regions. Our team’s aim is to achieve the biggest economic 
benefits for the American people, and these negotiators will be working to 
set a new standard for 21st century trade pacts.
9  Meredith Kolsky Lewis ‘Expanding the P-4 Trade Agreement into a Broader Trans-Pacific 
Partnership: Implications, Risks and Opportunities’ (2009) 4 Asian J WTO & Int’l Health L & Pol’y 
401 at 403–404.
10  Office of the United States Trade Representative ‘USTR Begins TPP Talks in Australia’ 
(press release, 15 March 2010).
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After nearly six years of negotiations, an agreement was finally reached 
in Atlanta in October 2015.11 This agreement contains 30 chapters, 
covering a wide range of issues, such as market access, textiles and apparel, 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, investment, financial services, 
telecommunications, electronic commerce, government procurement, 
competition, intellectual property, labour, the environment and regulatory 
standards. The agreement also includes various annexes and side letters 
regarding tariff commitments, product-specific rules, country-based 
arrangements and non-conforming measures.
Chapter 18 is devoted entirely to intellectual property matters.12 It covers 
a wide variety of areas, including cooperation,13 trademarks,14 country 
names,15 geographical indications,16 patents and undisclosed test or other 
data,17 industrial designs,18 copyright and related rights,19 enforcement20 
and internet service providers.21
2.2 RCEP
The RCEP negotiations did not start until more than two years after the 
beginning of the TPP negotiations. Launched in November 2012, 
the RCEP negotiations were established not solely as a reactive response 
or a defensive measure. Instead, they built on prior efforts in various fora 
to facilitate economic integration and cooperation in the Asian Pacific 
region. These fora include ASEAN+3 (ASEAN, China, Japan and South 
Korea), ASEAN+6 (ASEAN+3, Australia, India and New Zealand) 
and APEC.
11  Office of the Press Secretary ‘Statement by the President on the Trans-Pacific Partnership’ 
(press release, 5 October 2015) [TPP Press Release].
12  TPP Agreement, above n 2, at ch 18.
13  Section B.
14  Section C.
15  Section D.
16  Section E.
17  Section F.
18  Section G.
19  Section H.
20  Section I.
21  Section J.
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In October 2001, the East Asian Vision Group, which was charged 
with ‘develop[ing] a road map to guide future regional cooperation’,22 
recommended to ASEAN+3 leaders the establishment of the East Asia 
Free Trade Area.23 Although China strongly supported this proposal, 
Japan and other Asian countries had serious reservations about China’s 
potential dominance in this pact.24
Five years later, Japan advanced an alternative proposal concerning the 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia.25 Covering not only 
ASEAN+3 members but also the three remaining ASEAN+6 members 
(Australia, India and New Zealand), this partnership would dilute China’s 
influence in the regional pact while adding to the mix a major source 
of natural resources – namely, Australia.26
Around that time, APEC members also actively explored regional 
integration and cooperation efforts. In November 2006, APEC began 
studying the concept of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP).27 
Three years later, APEC leaders pledged to create an agreement to realise 
this conceptual vision. Since then, APEC leaders have endorsed various 
declarations laying down the incremental steps needed to realise the 
FTAAP, including the Pathways to FTAAP and the Beijing Roadmap for 
APEC’s Contribution to the Realization of the FTAAP.28
In November 2011, ASEAN, with the support of both China and Japan, 
proposed to merge the initiatives concerning the East Asia Free Trade Area 
and the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia to form the 
22  Mark Beeson Institutions of the Asia-Pacific: ASEAN, APEC and Beyond (Routledge, London, 
2009) at 78.
23  Shujiro Urata ‘Japan’s FTA Strategy and a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific’ in Charles E 
Morrison and Eduardo Pedrosa (eds) An APEC Trade Agenda? The Political Economy of a Free Trade 
Area of the Asia-Pacific (ISEAS Publishing, Singapore, 2007) 99 at 106.
24  Beeson, above n  22, at 88; Shintaro Hamanaka ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership versus Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting’ (Asian 
Development Bank, Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 146, December 
2014) at 10; Meredith Kolsky Lewis ‘Achieving a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific: Does the TPP 
Present the Most Attractive Path?’ in CL Lim, Deborah Kay Elms and Patrick Low (eds) The Trans-
Pacific Partnership: A Quest for a Twenty-First Century Trade Agreement (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2012) 223 at 227 (doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139236775.022).
25  Lewis, above n 24, at 228; Urata, above n 23, at 106–107.
26  Mark Beeson Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia: Politics, Security and Economic 
Development (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2007) at 224; Urata, above n 23, at 111.
27  Lewis, above n 24, at 223.
28  Asia-Pacific Economic Corporation Forum Pathways to FTAAP (14 November 2010); Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Forum The Beijing Roadmap for APEC’s Contribution to the Realization of the 
FTAAP (11 November 2014).
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RCEP.29 At the 19th ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia, ASEAN leaders 
adopted the Framework for Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.30 
Formal negotiations were finally launched in November 2012 at the 
21st ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. As ASEAN+6 leaders 
declared at that time, the RCEP negotiations were established to:31
[a]chieve a modern, comprehensive, high-quality and mutually 
beneficial economic partnership agreement establishing an open trade 
and investment environment in the region to facilitate the expansion of 
regional trade and investment and contribute to global economic growth 
and development; [and]
[b]oost economic growth and equitable economic development, advance 
economic cooperation and broaden and deepen integration in the region 
through the RCEP, which will build upon our existing economic linkages.
Although the ASEAN+6 leaders’ joint declaration did not specifically 
mention the TPP, there is no denying that the development of this United 
States–led partnership greatly accelerated the RCEP negotiations.32 The 
latter negotiations were particularly urgent when two major ASEAN+6 
economies, China and India, were intentionally excluded from the TPP.33 
Also excluded were other key ASEAN+6 members, such as Indonesia, the 
Philippines, South Korea and Thailand. While some of these countries 
had been invited to the TPP negotiations but declined to participate,34 
others were simply ignored.
Undoubtedly, there were both economic and non-economic reasons for 
not inviting these countries to the TPP negotiations. Yet the outcome was 
the same: while the excluded countries could still join the partnership 
once it had been established, they would not be able to shape the standards 
involved and could only accept the final terms as agreed upon by the 
29  Hamanaka, above n 24, at 11; Ganeshan Wignaraja ‘The Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership: An Initial Assessment’ in Tang Guoqiang and Peter A Petri (eds) New Directions in 
Asia-Pacific Economic Integration (East-West Center, Honolulu, 2014) 93 at 94.
30  ASEAN Framework for Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (12 June 2012).
31  ASEAN Plus Six Joint Declaration on the Launch of Negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (20 November 2012).
32  Du Ming ‘Explaining China’s Tripartite Strategy toward the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement’ 
(2015) 18 J Int’l Econ L 407 at 424; Hamanaka, above n 24, at 13; Michael Wesley ‘Who Calls 
the Tune? Asia Has to Dance to Duelling Trade Agendas’ (19  October 2014) The Conversation 
theconversation.com.
33  Peter K Yu ‘TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities’ (2014) 37 Fordham Int’l LJ 1129 at 1132–1163.
34  Yoo Choonsik ‘South Korea Moves Closer to Joining TPP Trade Talks’ Reuters (online ed, 
29 November 2013); Alan Raybould ‘Thailand Says to Join Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Talks’ 
Reuters (online ed, 18 November 2012).
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original negotiating parties. Such an outcome was highly unattractive, 
if not unacceptable, to large Asian economies such as China and India. 
It is therefore unsurprising that these countries have turned their time, 
attention and energy towards the RCEP to develop regional standards 
based on their own preferences and experiences.35
At the time of writing, ASEAN+6 members have already entered into over 
20 rounds of negotiations. Once the RCEP Agreement is completed, the 
final text is anticipated to cover a wide range of areas, including ‘trade in 
goods, trade in services, investment, economic and technical cooperation, 
intellectual property, competition [and] dispute settlement’.36 Beyond 
these areas, working or sub-working groups have also been established 
to address rules of origin; customs procedures and trade facilitation; legal 
and institutional issues; sanitary and phytosanitary measures; standards, 
technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures; electronic 
commerce; financial services; and telecommunications.37
Given this large number of working and sub-working groups, it remains to 
be seen whether their establishment will result in the creation of standalone 
chapters in each specific area. Regardless of how the final agreement is 
structured, however, that agreement is likely to be as ambitious as the TPP 
Agreement, which contains 30 different chapters in the final text. In light 
of this expansive and comprehensive coverage, questions have already been 
raised about the potential rivalry, compatibility and complementarity 
between these two mega-regional agreements.
3 TPP and RCEP Norms
Although no draft text has thus far been officially released to the public, 
Knowledge Ecology International made available online a leaked 
15 October 2015 draft of the RCEP intellectual property chapter (draft 
RCEP chapter).38 To better understand the copyright norms that are being 
developed in the Asian Pacific region, it will be instructive to compare this 
leaked draft with the TPP intellectual property chapter (TPP chapter).39
35  Hamanaka, above n 24, at 12–15.
36  ASEAN Plus Six Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (30 August 2012) at preamble [Guiding Principles].
37  ‘Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: News’ Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade dfat.gov.au.
38  ‘2015 Oct 15 version: RCEP IP Chapter’ (19 April 2016) Knowledge Ecology International 
keionline.org [Draft RCEP Chapter].
39  TPP Agreement, above n 2, at ch 18.
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Despite the recent signing of the CPTPP, this comparison continues 
to focus on the TPP for three reasons. First, the comparison between 
the TPP chapter and the draft RCEP chapter highlights the significant 
differences between the two mega-regional norm-setting exercises. These 
differences not only reflect the varied positions taken by leading players in 
the Asian Pacific region, but they also underscore the limited divergence 
between the TPP and RCEP intellectual property norms. Since these two 
sets of norms have not diverged significantly, it is likely that the CPTPP 
and RCEP norms will diverge even less. Second, the present comparison 
paves the way for the discussion of the CPTPP in the next section. That 
discussion will enable readers to take stock of the select TPP intellectual 
property provisions that the CPTPP has suspended. It will also allow them 
to compare the TPP and CPTPP intellectual property norms. Third, this 
section will become useful should the United States choose to revive the 
TPP or incorporate its intellectual property norms into future bilateral, 
regional or plurilateral trade agreements.
Because the scope and coverage of this volume do not allow for a detailed 
exploration of the large number of intellectual property provisions in the 
draft RCEP chapter, this section focuses on only the draft sections on 
copyright and related rights40 and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights.41 It is nonetheless worth remembering that other sections or other 
draft chapters, such as those on investment and electronic commerce, 
could deeply affect or be relevant to intellectual property protection and 
enforcement. For example, the TPP investment chapter, which seeks to 
establish an investor–state dispute settlement mechanism, became highly 
controversial after Eli Lilly and Philip Morris used similar mechanisms in 
bilateral or regional trade agreements to address their intellectual property 
disputes.42
40  Section 2.
41  Section 9.
42  Eli Lilly and Company v Government of Canada (Final Award) ICSID UNCT/14/2 16 March 
2017; Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v Oriental Republic of Uruguay (Award) ICSID ARB/10/7 8  July 
2016; Philip Morris Asia Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility) 
UNCITRAL PCA 2012-12 17 December 2015. For these disputes and the use of the investor–state 
dispute settlement mechanism, see Cynthia M Ho ‘Sovereignty under Siege: Corporate Challenges 
to Domestic Intellectual Property Decisions’ (2015) 30 Berkeley Tech LJ 213; Ruth L Okediji 
‘Is Intellectual Property “Investment”? Eli Lilly v Canada and the International Intellectual Property 
System’ (2014) 35 U Pa J Int’l L 1121; Peter K Yu ‘Crossfertilizing ISDS with TRIPS’ (2017) 49 
Loy U Chi LJ 321; and Peter K Yu ‘The Investment-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ 
(2017) 66 Am U L Rev 829.
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3.1 Copyright and Related Rights
In the area of copyright and related rights, the draft RCEP chapter includes 
the usual language43 found in free trade agreements (FTAs) requiring the 
accession to the two internet-related treaties of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) – the WIPO Copyright Treaty and 
the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.44 Going beyond the 
terms of the TPP Agreement, the draft chapter45 also requires accession 
to the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances,46 the International 
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms 
and Broadcasting Organizations (Rome Convention)47 and the Marrakesh 
Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, 
Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled.48
In addition, the draft RCEP chapter includes the usual provisions on 
technological protection measures and electronic rights management 
information,49 which are both significantly shorter and more flexible than 
their counterparts in the TPP Agreement.50 Targeting online streaming 
and other new means of digital communication, the draft RCEP chapter 
also includes provisions addressing the unauthorised communication, or 
the making available, of a copyright work to the public.51 The push for 
such provisions is understandable considering the increasing volume of 
copyright infringement litigation concerning works disseminated through 
streaming or other digital technologies.52
43  Draft RCEP Chapter, above n 38, art 1.7.6(g)–(h).
44  WIPO Copyright Treaty 2186 UNTS 121 (adopted 20 December 1996, entered into force 
6 March 2002) [WCT]; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 2186 UNTS 203 (adopted 
20 December 1996, entered into force 20 May 2002).
45  Draft RCEP Chapter, above n 38, art 1.7.6(h)–(ibis).
46  Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances (adopted 24 June 2012).
47  International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organizations 496 UNTS 43 (adopted 26 October 1961, entered into force 18 May 
1964).
48  Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually 
Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled (adopted 27 June 2013, entered into force 30 September 2016).
49  Draft RCEP Chapter, above n 38, arts 2.3, 2.3bis and 2.3ter.
50  See Susan Corbett ‘Free Trade Agreements with the United States, Rulemaking and TPMs: Why 
Asian Pacific Nations Should Resist Increased Regulation of TPMs in Their Domestic Copyright 
Laws’ in this volume.
51  Draft RCEP Chapter, above n 38, art 2.1.1–2.1.2.
52  Among the leading cases in this area are American Broadcasting Companies v Aereo Inc 134 SCt 
2498 (2014) before the United States Supreme Court; ITV Broadcasting Ltd v TVCatchup Ltd (Main 
Proceedings) [2017] ECLI 144 C-275/15 before the Court of Justice of the European Union; and 
Maneki TV Saiko Saibansho (18 January 2011) 65 Minshū 121 before the Japanese Supreme Court.
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Among the negotiating parties, there was some effort – notably by 
Australia – to push for stronger language on copyright limitations and 
exceptions beyond the mere recitation of the three-step test in the TRIPS 
Agreement and the WIPO Copyright Treaty.53 Article 2.5.3 of the leaked 
draft states:
Each party shall endeavour to provide an appropriate balance in its 
copyright and related rights system by providing limitations and 
exceptions  …  for legitimate purposes including education, research, 
criticism, comment, news reporting, libraries and archives and facilitating 
access for persons with disability.
The purposes listed in this provision are very similar to those found in the 
preamble of the United States fair use provision.54
Like the TPP chapter, the draft RCEP chapter includes a provision 
prohibiting government use of infringing computer software.55 Unlike 
the TPP chapter, however, the draft RCEP chapter does not extend the 
copyright term beyond the life of the author plus 50 years – the minimum 
required by the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works.56 The draft RCEP chapter also does not include detailed TPP-like 
provisions on internet service providers, secondary liability for copyright 
infringement, and the notice and takedown mechanism (although those 
provisions could easily have been negotiated as part of the yet-to-be-
disclosed electronic commerce chapter, if that chapter indeed exists).
To the disappointment of consumer advocates and civil society 
organisations, South Korea proposed language that would require 
countries to ‘take effective measures to curtail repetitive infringement of 
copyright and related rights on the Internet or other digital network’.57 
In addition, Japan called for the disclosure of information concerning the 
accounts of allegedly infringing internet subscribers.58 It further advanced 
a footnote supporting ‘a regime providing for limitations on the liability 
of, or on the remedies available against, online service providers while 
preserving the legitimate interests of [the] right holder’.59
53  TRIPS Agreement, above n 7, art 13; WCT, above n 44, art 10(1).
54  17 USC § 107.
55  Draft RCEP Chapter, above n 38, art 4.2.
56  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1161 UNTS 31 (adopted 
9 September 1886, entered into force 5 December 1887, revised at Paris 24 July 1971) art 7(1).
57  Draft RCEP Chapter, above n 38, art 9quinquies.3.
58  Article 9quinquies.4.
59  Article 9quinquies.2, n 43.
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Even more alarming to many developing countries, the draft RCEP 
chapter offers stronger and more expansive protection to broadcasters than 
the TPP chapter, covering such issues as the unauthorised retransmission 
of television signals over the internet.60 As Jeremy Malcolm commented:61
Based on the current text proposals, [the] RCEP may actually impose 
more stringent protections for broadcasters than the TPP does. The TPP 
allows authors, performers and producers to control the broadcast of 
their work, but it does not bestow any independent powers over those 
works upon broadcasters. [The] RCEP, in contrast, could create such new 
powers; potentially providing broadcasters with a 50 year monopoly over 
the retransmission of broadcast signals, including retransmission of those 
signals over the Internet.
3.2 Intellectual Property Enforcement
With respect to intellectual property enforcement, the draft RCEP 
chapter includes the usual provisions concerning civil, criminal and 
administrative procedures and remedies, as well as provisional and border 
measures. Although a considerable portion of the draft language in the 
enforcement section merely reaffirms the existing rights and obligations 
under the TRIPS Agreement, the proposed language increases the 
obligations concerning the seizure and destruction of allegedly infringing 
goods, including the grant of authority to take ex officio action62 and 
to seize or destroy the materials or implements used to create infringing 
goods.63 The draft chapter also seeks to empower judicial authorities to 
determine damages for intellectual property infringement based on lost 
profits, the market price or the suggested retail price.64
Like the TPP chapter, the draft RCEP chapter calls for criminal procedures 
and penalties for unauthorised camcording in cinemas.65 Unlike the TPP, 
however, the draft RCEP chapter does not have extensive provisions 
on criminal procedures and penalties. These provisions do not apply to 
60  Article 2.6.
61  Jeremy Malcolm ‘RCEP: The Other Closed-Door Agreement to Compromise Users’ Rights’ 
(20 April 2016) Electronic Frontier Foundation www.eff.org.
62  Draft RCEP Chapter, above n 38, art 9ter.5.
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either trade secret infringement or the circumvention of technological 
protection measures. The draft provisions on border measures are also less 
detailed and less invasive.66
At the time when the leaked draft was being negotiated, the RCEP 
negotiating parties strongly disagreed on the appropriate standards 
concerning criminal liability for aiding and abetting,67 the award 
of attorneys’ fees68 and obligations relating to intellectual property 
enforcement in the digital environment.69 Facing strong opposition from 
its negotiating partners, South Korea remained the lone party calling for 
the provision of pre-established damages.70
In sum, the draft RCEP chapter, like any other treaty in the middle of 
the negotiation process, includes a wide array of bracketed texts. While 
some draft provisions are stronger than, or similar to, what is found 
in the TPP Agreement, other language is much weaker. The draft text 
also includes language that cannot be found in the TPP Agreement or 
other TRIPS-plus FTAs. Given that ‘nothing is agreed until everything is 
agreed’71 – a favourite aphorism of treaty negotiators and other government 
officials – it remains to be seen what the final RCEP intellectual property 
chapter will look like.
4 United States’ TPP Withdrawal and the 
Adoption of the CPTPP
The previous section has shown that both the TPP chapter and the 
draft RCEP chapter have called for higher protection and enforcement 
standards that go beyond what is required by the TRIPS Agreement. 
While differences still exist between the two chapters, it will not be far-
fetched to assume that the copyright norms in the Asian Pacific region 






71  Henrique C Moraes ‘Dealing with Forum Shopping: Some Lessons from the Negotiation on 
SECURE at the World Customs Organization’ in Li Xuan and Carlos Correa (eds) Intellectual Property 
Enforcement: International Perspectives (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2009) 159 at 176.
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into force. Nevertheless, this seemingly predictable norm-setting picture 
has been complicated by the United States’ withdrawal from the TPP in 
January 2017.72
Although the Obama Administration described this mega-regional 
agreement as a ‘cardinal priority and a cornerstone of [its] Pivot to 
Asia’,73 its successor made an about turn within a year of signing the TPP 
Agreement. On the first day of his first full week in office, President Trump 
signed a memorandum directing the USTR to ‘withdraw the United 
States as a signatory to the [TPP and] … from the TPP negotiations’.74 
As the document stated, ‘it is the intention of [the new] Administration to 
deal directly with individual countries on a one-on-one (or bilateral) basis 
in negotiating future trade deals’. Not only did the Trump Administration 
abandon the TPP Agreement after six years of exhaustive negotiations, 
but it also shifted the policy emphasis away from regional and plurilateral 
trade agreements.75
Given the United States’ new policy position, one cannot help but wonder 
what the future will hold for the TPP Agreement and its high TRIPS-plus 
intellectual property norms. Will this mega-regional agreement meet the 
same fate as the widely criticised Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA),76 which was signed by most negotiating parties but failed to attain 
the requisite number of ratifications?77 Will the Trump Administration 
eventually change its course? Or will other TPP partners manage to 
salvage the agreement even without the United States’ participation?
Shortly after the announcement of the United States’ withdrawal, 
Australia, Japan, Singapore and New Zealand explored ways to resuscitate 
the TPP Agreement.78 At a May 2017 APEC meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam, 
these countries, along with other remaining TPP partners, reaffirmed 
their commitment to establishing the regional partnership and agreed 
to explore the development of a process to move the pact forward even 
72  Presidential Memorandum, above n 8.
73  Kurt M Campbell The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia (Twelve, New York, 2016) 
at 268.
74  Presidential Memorandum, above n 8.
75  Peter K Yu ‘Trump’s Trade Policy Is More Predictable and Less Isolationist than Critics Think’ 
(3 February 2017) MarketWatch www.marketwatch.com.
76  Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 50 ILM 243 (adopted 15 April 2011) [ACTA].
77  Despite its adoption in April 2011, the ACTA has thus far been ratified by only one country – 
Japan, the country of depositary.
78  Bhavan Jaipragas ‘Can the Trans-Pacific Partnership Be Salvaged? Forget Trump – Malaysia, 
Australia, New Zealand Think So’ South China Morning Post (online ed, 24 January 2017).
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without the United States’ participation.79 These proactive remedial efforts 
made good sense considering that Japan and New Zealand had already 
ratified the agreement.
A few months later, the 11 remaining TPP partners ‘agreed on the core 
elements’ of the CPTPP, opting to retain the majority of the original pact 
while suspending those provisions that had been pushed by United States 
negotiators but were of no interest, or of very limited interest, to the 
remaining partners.80 On 23 January 2018, exactly a year after President 
Trump signed his controversial presidential memorandum, the CPTPP 
negotiations concluded in Tokyo, Japan. The agreement was subsequently 
signed in Santiago, Chile, on 8 March.
Although art 1 of the CPTPP incorporates by reference all 30 chapters of 
the TPP Agreement,81 including the intellectual property chapter, art 2 
suspends the following provisions:82
• art 18.63 (Term of Protection for Copyright and Related Rights);
• art 18.68 (Technological Protection Measures);
• art 18.69 (Rights Management Information);
• art 18.79 (Protection of Encrypted Program-Carrying Satellite and 
Cable Signals); and
• art 18.82 (Legal Remedies and Safe Harbours).
For comparative purposes, the above list includes only those provisions 
that relate to copyright and related rights and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights. It is worth noting that the CPTPP has also suspended 
many provisions in the areas of patents and undisclosed information.
The suspension of all of these provisions has greatly impacted on the future 
of intellectual property norm-setting in the Asian Pacific region. Not only 
has such suspension minimised the differences between the TPP/CPTPP 
and RCEP intellectual property norms, it has also caused the draft RCEP 
chapter to offer stronger protection than the CPTPP. Notwithstanding 
these complications, a proper comparison between the TPP/CPTPP and 
79  ‘Pacific Ministers Commit to Move Ahead with Pact without US’ US News & World Report 
(online ed, 21 May 2017).
80  ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership Ministerial Statement’ (press release, 11 November 2017) at para 3.
81  Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (signed 8 March 2018) 
art 1 [CPTPP].
82  Annex, art 7(g)–(k).
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RCEP intellectual property norms will have to take into consideration not 
only the recent suspension of select TPP provisions, but also the time that 
has elapsed since the leaked RCEP draft chapter.
The draft RCEP chapter was leaked more than two years ago. Most 
certainly, the negotiations of that chapter have already advanced beyond 
what the October 2015 draft has revealed. Moreover, the TPP/CPTPP 
and the RCEP were established as two rivalrous, though potentially 
complementary, norm-setting exercises. It will therefore be no surprise 
if the RCEP has been negotiated in the shadow of the TPP negotiations 
and the post-TPP developments. Now that the CPTPP offers much 
weaker protection than the TPP, many RCEP negotiating partners will 
understandably demand lower standards that correspond to the CPTPP.
Nevertheless, while the CPTPP has played an important and fast-growing 
role in intellectual property norm-setting in the Asian Pacific region, we 
should not ignore the lingering impact of the TPP. As I noted in an earlier 
article, regardless of whether the TPP is dead or alive, it may exert four 
types of influence that will deeply affect the future of intellectual property 
norm-setting in the Asian Pacific region.83
To begin with, the various chapters in the TPP Agreement, including its 
intellectual property chapter, may continue to provide the much-needed 
templates for drafting future bilateral, regional and plurilateral trade 
agreements. Thus far, the United States has relied heavily on templates to 
maximise effectiveness and efficiency in trade negotiations.84 As policies 
change and new issues arise, these templates will be updated. Indeed, 
many terms in the earlier FTAs developed by the United States have 
already found their way to later agreements. In the intellectual property 
arena, for instance, ACTA and the TPP Agreement have all incorporated 
terms from these agreements, most notably the Korea – United States Free 
Trade Agreement.85
83  Yu, above n 4, at 101–110.
84  Peter Drahos ‘BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property’ (2001) 4 J World Intell 
Prop 791 at 794; Susy Frankel ‘Challenging TRIPS-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-
Violation Disputes’ (2009) 12 J Int’l Econ L 1023 at 1025; Peter K Yu ‘Sinic Trade Agreements’ 
(2011) 44 UC Davis L Rev 953 at 1011–1013.
85  Peter K Yu ‘Trade Agreement Cats and the Digital Technology Mouse’ in Bryan Mercurio 
and Ni Kuei-Jung (eds) Science and Technology in International Economic Law: Balancing Competing 
Interests (Routledge, London, 2014) 185 at 196.
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Even more disturbing, South Korea injected the terms of its FTA with 
the United States into the RCEP negotiations, despite the fact that the 
United States is not a party to those negotiations.86 As Jeremy Malcolm 
lamented:87
Far from setting up a positive alternative to the TPP, South Korea is 
channeling the USTR at its worst here – what on earth are they thinking? 
The answer may be that, having been pushed into accepting unfavorably 
strict copyright, patent, and trademark rules in the process of negotiating 
its 2012 free trade agreement with the United States, Korea considers that 
it would be at a disadvantage if other countries were not subject to the 
same restrictions.
The second type of influence relates to the potential development of new 
international intellectual property norms that will incorporate the TPP 
Agreement by reference. A widely cited example of such development 
is the TRIPS Agreement’s incorporation of the Washington Treaty on 
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits. Although the 
latter treaty has never entered into force, art 35 of the TRIPS Agreement 
explicitly incorporates its obligations as follows:88
Members agree to provide protection to the layout-designs (topographies) 
of integrated circuits … in accordance with Articles 2 through 7 (other 
than paragraph 3 of Article 6), Article 12 and paragraph 3 of Article 16 of 
the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits … .
The third type of influence concerns the potential use of the terms of 
the TPP Agreement to determine whether a country has adequately 
protected intellectual property rights. Of great notoriety regarding this 
type of determination is the USTR’s Special 301 process.89 As the United 
States Trade Act stipulates, the USTR can take Special 301 actions against 
86  Peter K Yu ‘The RCEP and Trans-Pacific Intellectual Property Norms’ (2017) 50 Vand J Transnat’l 
L 673 at 700–701.
87  Jeremy Malcolm ‘Meet RCEP, a Trade Agreement in Asia That’s Even Worse than TPP or ACTA’ 
(4 June 2015) Electronic Frontier Foundation www.eff.org.
88  TRIPS Agreement, above n 7, art 35.
89  19 USC §§  2411–2420. On this process, see Jagdish Bhagwati and Hugh T Patrick (eds) 
Aggressive Unilateralism: America’s 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System (University of 
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1990); Joe Karaganis and Sean Flynn ‘Networked Governance and the 
USTR’ in Joe Karaganis (ed) Media Piracy in Emerging Goods (Social Science Research Council, 
New York, 2011) 75 at 75–98; Paul C B Liu ‘U.S. Industry’s Influence on Intellectual Property 
Negotiations and Special 301 Actions’ (1994) 13 UCLA Pac Basin LJ 87.
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countries that have failed to provide ‘adequate and effective protection of 
intellectual property rights notwithstanding the fact that [they] may be in 
compliance with the specific obligations of the [TRIPS] Agreement’.90
For instance, the USTR has repeatedly put Canada on the Special 301 
Watch List, citing the country’s failure to ratify the WIPO Internet 
Treaties, among other reasons.91 Likewise, before China acceded to those 
treaties, the USTR stated in the 2005 National Trade Estimate Report on 
Foreign Trade Barriers that ‘the United States consider[ed] the WIPO 
treaties to reflect many key international norms for providing copyright 
protection over the Internet’.92 The report further stated that ‘China’s 
accession to the WIPO treaties [was] an increasingly important priority 
for the United States’.93
The final type of influence pertains to the potential misguidance provided 
by technical assistance experts. Given the politically driven circumstances 
surrounding the United States’ withdrawal from the TPP, these experts 
may continue to treat the intellectual property provisions in the TPP 
Agreement as the world’s best practices – or, worse, the gold standard 
for intellectual property protection and enforcement.94 Oftentimes, these 
so-called ‘best practices’ are introduced without regard to a particular 
country’s local needs, interests, conditions or priorities. For developing 
countries, overemphasis on the high TPP intellectual property standards 
as international benchmarks may ultimately undermine the countries’ 
individual abilities to take advantage of the traditional limitations, 
safeguards and flexibilities provided in the TRIPS Agreement or other 
WIPO-administered international intellectual property agreements.95
In sum, although the TPP Agreement will not have any legal effect like the 
CPTPP, nor will it have as big an impact as it would have had upon taking 
effect, it may continue to exert considerable influence on intellectual 
property norm-setting in the Asian Pacific region. Thus, as important as 
it is to appreciate the growing role of the CPTPP and the ramifications 
90  19 USC § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(II) (emphasis added).
91  Office of the US Trade Representative 2010 Special 301 Report (Washington, 2010) at 25.
92  Office of the US Trade Representative 2005 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade 
Barriers (Washington, 2005) at 96.
93  Ibid.
94  Kimberlee Weatherall ‘Intellectual Property in the TPP: Not “the New TRIPS”’ (2016) 17 Melb 
J Int’l L 257 at 276.
95  Peter K Yu ‘The International Enclosure Movement’ (2007) 82 Ind LJ 827 at 869–870.
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for the suspended TPP intellectual property provisions, policymakers and 
commentators in the region should not overlook the lingering influence 
of the TPP.
5 Future of Copyright Norm-Setting
Although the ratification of the TPP sparked considerable debate, the 
United States’ subsequent withdrawal from the regional pact has generated 
a new line of inquiry concerning the future of intellectual property norm-
setting in the Asian Pacific region. Will the United States finally lose 
ground to China in its effort to shape future regional intellectual property 
norms?96 Will the developments surrounding the TPP and the CPTPP 
accelerate or retard the RCEP negotiations? Will the RCEP negotiating 
parties eventually reject the inclusion of an intellectual property chapter 
in their regional pact in light of the complications surrounding the TPP 
and the CPTPP?
To address this line of inquiry, this section focuses on three specific 
questions. First, will the United States’ withdrawal from the TPP and 
the recent adoption of the CPTPP lead to the omission of an intellectual 
property chapter in the RCEP Agreement? Second, if such a chapter indeed 
exists, will it contain high protection and enforcement standards? Third, 
will the ultimate standards adopted in the RCEP Agreement conflict with 
those stipulated in the CPTPP or other FTAs developed by the United 
States, including a revived or modified TPP Agreement?
5.1 An Intellectual Property Chapter?
The first question concerning whether the RCEP Agreement will contain 
an intellectual property chapter is easy to answer. Although it is still possible 
for the RCEP negotiating parties to reject the inclusion of such a chapter, 
especially in light of the wide variation in intellectual property protection 
96  Giovanni Di Lieto ‘If the TPP Dies, Australia Has Other Game Changing Trade Options’ 
(4 September 2016) The Conversation theconversation.com; Nicholas Ross Smith ‘China Will Be 
the Winner if US Backs Out of the TPP’ (1 August 2016) The Conversation theconversation.com.
MAkING COPyRIGHT WORk FOR THE ASIAN PACIFIC? 
38
and enforcement across the Asian Pacific region,97 past negotiations and 
ongoing developments have indicated a strong likelihood for this chapter 
to exist.
There are at least three strands of evidence to support such an existence. 
First, when ASEAN+6 members adopted the Guiding Principles and 
Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
in August 2012, they agreed to include an intellectual property text in 
the RCEP Agreement.98 After the establishment of the Working Group 
on Intellectual Property at the third round of the RCEP negotiations 
in January 2014, that group has also worked actively to develop the 
draft text of the intellectual property chapter.99 Absent any catastrophic 
developments in the RCEP negotiations, the time and effort invested in 
this working group is just too substantial for the chapter to be abandoned 
at this late stage.
Second, given the importance of intellectual property industries to 
countries such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea, it is 
very unlikely that these countries will be content with a regional trade 
and investment agreement that does not contain an intellectual property 
chapter. If these countries threaten to pull out of the RCEP negotiations, 
the key question for the remaining ASEAN+6 members will no longer be 
about whether the agreement should omit an intellectual property chapter, 
but whether such omission is so important to them that they would rather 
lose the entire regional pact or the participation of key neighbours in this 
pact than include the chapter.
Third, apart from the developed country members of ASEAN+6, China, 
India and other emerging countries in the region – or what I have called 
‘middle intellectual property powers’100 – have begun to appreciate 
the strategic benefits of stronger intellectual property protection and 
enforcement. Although these countries have yet to embrace the very high 
protection and enforcement standards found in the European Union, 
Japan or the United States, they now welcome standards that are higher 
97  Peter K Yu ‘Clusters and Links in Asian Intellectual Property Law and Policy’ in Christoph 
Antons (ed) Routledge Handbook of Asian Law (Routledge, Milton Park, 2017) 147 at 148; Peter K Yu 
‘Intellectual Property and Asian Values’ (2012) 16 Marq Intell Prop L Rev 329 at 339–370.
98  Guiding Principles, above n 36, s V.
99  ‘Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: News’, above n 37.
100  Peter K Yu ‘The Middle Intellectual Property Powers’ in Randall Peerenboom and Tom Ginsburg 
(eds) Law and Development in Middle-Income Countries: Avoiding the Middle-Income Trap (Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2014) 84 at 84.
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than those currently available in the Asian Pacific region. These countries 
are therefore unlikely to block the inclusion of an intellectual property 
chapter in the RCEP Agreement.
5.2 High Intellectual Property Standards?
The second question concerning whether the RCEP intellectual property 
chapter will contain high protection and enforcement standards is much 
harder to answer. To begin with, it is difficult to predict the actual content 
of any unfinished and fast-evolving chapter. That the RCEP Agreement 
will provide for special and differential treatment101 – a key distinction 
from the TPP or the CPTPP – has made such prediction particularly 
difficult. After all, the more special accommodation the agreement 
will provide to developing countries, the more eager their developed 
counterparts are to demand high overall standards.
At first glance, lower protection and enforcement standards will provide 
greater benefits to countries in the Asian Pacific region. Because many 
of these countries are still developing countries, they will be better off 
declining the adoption of high intellectual property standards, which tend 
to ignore their local needs, national interests, technological capabilities, 
institutional capacities and public health conditions.102 At the time of 
writing, there remain significant regional variations in economic condition, 
imitative or innovative capacity, research and development productivity 
and availability of human capital. An innovative model that works well in 
the developed world is therefore unlikely to work well in the developing 
world.103 Not only may the unquestioned adoption of high intellectual 
property standards from abroad fail to result in greater innovative efforts, 
101  Shujiro Urata ‘A Stages Approach to Regional Economic Integration in Asia Pacific: The RCEP, 
TPP, and FTAAP’ in Tang Guoqiang and Peter A Petri (eds) New Directions in Asia-Pacific Economic 
Integration (East-West Center, Honolulu, 2014) 119 at 127.
102  Yu, above n 95, at 866–870.
103  Claudio R Frischtak ‘Harmonization versus Differentiation in Intellectual Property Rights 
Regime’ in Mitchel B Wallerstein, Mary Ellen Mogee and Roberta A Schoen Global Dimensions of 
Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology (National Academy Press, Washington, 1993) 
89 at 93–97; David Silverstein ‘Intellectual Property Rights, Trading Patterns and Practices, Wealth 
Distribution, Development and Standards of Living: A North-South Perspective on Patent Law 
Harmonization’ in George R Stewart, Myra J Tawfik and Maureen Irish (eds) International Trade and 
Intellectual Property: The Search for a Balanced System (Westview Press, Boulder, 1994) 155 at 156; 
Yu, above n 95, at 889.
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industrial progress and technology transfers, such adoption may drain 
away the resources needed for dealing with the socioeconomic and public 
health problems created by the new legislation.
Even worse, the introduction of legal reforms based on foreign intellectual 
property systems may exacerbate the dire economic plight of many 
developing countries, as these new laws would enable foreign rights 
holders in developed and emerging countries to crush local industries 
through lawsuits or litigation threats.104 Even if these new laws could be 
beneficial in the long run, many of these countries might not have the 
wealth, infrastructure and technological base to take advantage of the 
opportunities created by the system in the short run.105 For countries with 
urgent public policy needs or a dying population due to inaccessibility to 
essential medicines, the realisation of the hope for a brighter long-term 
future seems far away, if not unrealistic. If protection were strengthened 
beyond the point of an appropriate balance, the present population would 
undoubtedly suffer greatly.
As if these challenges were not difficult enough, greater harmonisation 
of intellectual property standards, while potentially beneficial, can take 
away valuable opportunities for experimentation with new regulatory 
and economic policies.106 The lack of diversified standards can also reduce 
competition among jurisdictions while preventing each jurisdiction 
from deciding for itself what rules and systems it wants to adopt, 
thereby rendering the lawmaking process less accountable to the local 
populations.107 In the digital age, when laws are hastily introduced and 
often without convincing empirical evidence, greater experimentation 
and competition are badly needed.108
Notwithstanding the many potential problems and challenges brought 
about by transplanting intellectual property standards from abroad, the 
technological rise of China, India and other emerging countries in the 
Asian Pacific region in the past decade has called for a pause to rethink 
appropriate intellectual property norm-setting strategies. During the 
104  Ellen ’t Hoen ‘TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way 
from Seattle to Doha’ (2002) 3 Chi J Int’l L 27 at 30–31.
105  Keith E Maskus Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy (Institute for International 
Economics, Washington, 2000) at 237.
106  John F Duffy ‘Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law’ (2002) 17 Berkeley Tech LJ 685 
at 707–708.
107  At 706–707.
108  Peter K Yu ‘Anticircumvention and Anti-Anticircumvention’ (2006) 84 Denv U L Rev 13 at 
40–58.
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TRIPS negotiations, developing countries were repeatedly told that the 
TRIPS Agreement, along with other commitments in the WTO, would 
provide the painful medicine needed to boost economic development.109 
Although it is easy to dismiss the sales pitch of TRIPS advocates and 
supporters, it is much harder to evaluate whether China, India and the 
now-emerging countries in the Asian Pacific region have in fact benefited 
from the many economic reforms pushed on them by the WTO 
Agreement.
Consider China, for example. Many policymakers and commentators 
have now taken the view that China would not have been as economically 
developed and as technologically proficient as it is today had it not 
embraced the reforms required by WTO accession.110 Moreover, as 
China moved from the stage of transplanting foreign laws to the stage 
of developing indigenous standards,111 it has skilfully deployed ‘selective 
adaptation’ strategies112 to ensure the incorporation of only beneficial 
features from the outside without also transplanting the harmful and 
unsuitable elements.113
In sum, even though one could continue to debate how much China, 
India and other emerging countries have benefited from TRIPS-induced 
intellectual property reforms, it is much harder to deny the contributions 
the TRIPS Agreement has provided to the economic development and 
technological proficiency in these countries. Thus, as much as policymakers 
and commentators are eager to criticise the deleterious effects of TRIPS-
plus bilateral, regional and plurilateral agreements, such as the TPP, the 
CPTPP and the RCEP, they cannot lose sight of the agreements’ potential 
positive benefits.
109  Daniel J Gervais ‘The TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Round: History and Impact on 
Economic Development’ in Peter K Yu (ed) Intellectual Property and Information Wealth: Issues and 
Practices in the Digital Age (Praeger Publishers, Westport, 2007) vol 4, 23 at 43.
110  Campbell, above n 73, at 195; Peter K Yu ‘The Rise and Decline of the Intellectual Property 
Powers’ (2012) 34 Campbell L Rev 525 at 550–551; Gordon G Chang ‘TPP vs. RCEP: America and 
China Battle for Control of Pacific Trade’ National Interest (online ed, 6 October 2015).
111  Guo He ‘Patents’ in Rohan Kariyawasam (ed) Chinese Intellectual Property and Technology Laws 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2011) 25 at 28; Peter K Yu ‘Building the Ladder: Three 
Decades of Development of the Chinese Patent System’ (2013) 5 WIPO J 1 at 3–13.
112  Pitman B Potter ‘China and the International Legal System: Challenges of Participation’ 
in Donald C Clarke (ed) China’s Legal System: New Developments, New Challenges (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2008) 145 at 147–148; Wu Handong ‘One Hundred Years of Progress: 
The Development of the Intellectual Property System in China’ (2009) 1 WIPO J 117 at 118–119.
113  Peter K Yu ‘The Transplant and Transformation of Intellectual Property Laws in China’ in Nari 
Lee, Niklas Bruun and Li Mingde (eds) Governance of Intellectual Property Rights in China and Europe 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2016) 20 at 26.
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5.3 A Battle between the TPP, the CPTPP 
and the RCEP?
The last question concerning the conflicts between the TPP and the 
RCEP sometimes arises in view of the different leaderships involved. The 
adoption of the CPTPP has further complicated this question. While 
the TPP and the CPTPP evidence the leadership of the United States and 
Japan, respectively, many policymakers and commentators consider the 
RCEP a China-led mega-regional agreement. In light of such different 
leadership, it is logical to ask whether the TPP, the CPTPP and the RCEP 
would create conflicting obligations – or precipitate what I have described 
as the ‘battle of the FTAs’.114
These conflicting obligations will be problematic for not only developing 
countries in the Asian Pacific region but also their developed counterparts. 
Juggling different standards within the same region will be costly, inefficient 
and highly challenging. Even more importantly, the conflicts between 
the TPP/CPTPP and the RCEP will make Asia ‘a vital battleground in 
setting the rules of the global economic order’.115 As President Barack 
Obama declared after the conclusion of the TPP negotiations in Atlanta 
in October 2015:116
When more than 95 percent of our potential customers live outside our 
borders, we can’t let countries like China write the rules of the global 
economy. We should write those rules, opening new markets to American 
products while setting high standards for protecting workers and 
preserving our environment.
Interestingly, this proverbial battle between the TPP and the RCEP 
did not materialise before the United States withdrew from the TPP. 
Although the standards in the draft RCEP chapter still differ from their 
counterparts in the TPP Agreement, they were closer to each other than 
many anticipated. With the adoption of the CPTPP and the suspension 
of a number of TPP intellectual property provisions, the TPP/CPTPP 
and RCEP standards have become even closer. Thus, one could make 
a strong case that the two mega-regional norm-setting exercises, whether 
114  Yu, above n 84, at 1018–1027.
115  Campbell, above n 73, at 267.
116  TPP Press Release, above n 11.
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before or after the adoption of the CPTPP, reflect a growing convergence 
of regional intellectual property standards, similar to that induced by the 
TRIPS Agreement.117
There are at least five reasons why the TPP/CPTPP and RCEP negotiations 
have not led to significant conflicting obligations. First, seven of the 16 
RCEP negotiating parties – or, to be more precise, three and a half of the 
seven parties (Australia, Japan, New Zealand and close to half of ASEAN) 
– are TPP/CPTPP partners. As a result, they will have strong incentives to 
ensure that they can join the RCEP without violating the commitments 
made under the TPP Agreement or the CPTPP.118 If conflicts do arise, 
they are unlikely to be blatant, but will instead be more subtle and highly 
specific.
Second, as noted earlier, China, India and other emerging countries 
within ASEAN+6 have begun to realise the growing benefits of increased 
intellectual property protection and enforcement. As a result, they no 
longer mount as much resistance as they did to those high intellectual 
property standards that have already been widely adopted in the developed 
world. In fact, some leaders of these countries may welcome new RCEP 
standards, as these standards will provide the much-needed external push 
to accelerate domestic intellectual property reforms.119
Third, although China has wielded considerable influence in the RCEP 
negotiations, it has thus far kept a rather low profile. This negotiation 
posture is consistent with the approach China has taken in other 
international trade and intellectual property negotiations.120 In regard 
to the draft RCEP chapter, for instance, China did not even advance 
a proposal. As revealed by Knowledge Ecology International, the draft 
proposals came from other negotiating parties – namely, ASEAN, India, 
117  Yu ‘Clusters and Links’, above n 97, at 150–151.
118  Meredith Kolsky Lewis ‘The TPP and the RCEP (ASEAN+6) as Potential Paths toward Deeper 
Asian Economic Integration’ (2013) 8 Asian J WTO & Int’l Health L and Pol’y 359 at 369–370.
119  Peter K Yu ‘Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle’ in Daniel 
J Gervais (ed) Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development 
in a TRIPS Plus Era (1st ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) 173 at 192.
120  Henry S Gao ‘China’s Participation in the WTO: A Lawyer’s Perspective’ (2007) 11 Singapore 
Yearbook of International L 41 at 69; Peter K Yu ‘The Middle Kingdom and the Intellectual Property 
World’ (2011) 13 Or Rev of Int’l L 209 at 229–237.
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Japan and South Korea.121 The only area in which China has taken 
a more assertive position concerns the disclosure in patent applications 
of the source of origin of genetic resources used in the inventions,122 
a requirement that already exists in art 26 of the Chinese Patent Law.123
Fourth, if the RCEP is to successfully compete with the TPP/CPTPP as 
a viable alternative for setting trade norms in the Asian Pacific region, it 
will need to provide effective standards in the intellectual property area. 
Otherwise, it will lose the support of those economies that are driven 
heavily by intellectual property and technology industries. Although 
the United States’ withdrawal from the TPP has greatly reduced the 
competition the RCEP faces, the adoption of the CPTPP has revived 
such competition while retaining the possibility for the United States to 
resuscitate the TPP. In view of such competition, the RCEP will need 
to provide standards that are high enough to entice existing and future 
TPP/CPTPP partners to embrace the partnership as a dominant forum for 
setting regional intellectual property norms. Without such participation, 
a new regional pact could easily emerge to displace the RCEP even if the 
CPTPP is not eventually ratified.
Finally, ASEAN+6 leaders anticipate the coexistence of the TPP/
CPTPP and the RCEP, as revealed in the key documents relating 
to the development of the FTAAP.124 Adopted in November 2010, 
the Pathways to FTAAP registered the ASEAN+6 leaders’ belief that 
‘an FTAAP should be pursued … by developing and building on ongoing 
regional undertakings, such as ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and the Trans-
Pacific Partnership, among  others’.125 The Beijing Roadmap for APEC’s 
Contribution to the Realization of the FTAAP, which was released four 
years later, further stated that ‘[t]he FTAAP should aim to minimize any 
negative effects resulting from the proliferation of regional and bilateral 
[trade agreements]’.126
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Version: Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, Japan IPR Proposals, RCEP’ (9 February 
2015) Knowledge Ecology International www.keionline.org; ‘2014 Oct 10: ASEAN Proposals for 
RECP IP Chapter, Also India’ (8 June 2015) Knowledge Ecology International www.keionline.org; 
Yu, above n 86, at 683–684.
122  Draft RCEP Chapter, above n 38, art 7.1.
123  Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated 12 March 1984, amended 
27 December 2008, effective 1 October 2009) art 26.
124  Urata, above n 101, at 128–129.
125  Asia-Pacific Economic Corporation Forum Pathways to FTAAP (14 November 2010).
126  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum The Beijing Roadmap for APEC’s Contribution to the 
Realization of the FTAAP (11 November 2014).
45
1 . TPP, RCEP AND THE FUTURE OF COPyRIGHT NORM-SETTING IN THE ASIAN PACIFIC
Indeed, many policymakers and commentators believe the two mega-
regional agreements will eventually merge.127 As Kurt Campbell observed, 
‘[f ]or many in Asia, both the TPP and the RCEP are way stations on 
the path to the ultimate destination’.128 The anticipated merger is easy to 
understand considering that no ASEAN member – or, for that matter, 
Australia, New Zealand or any other RCEP negotiating party – wants to 
pick between Beijing and Washington in developing their trade relations, 
despite their ongoing concern about China’s growing economic and 
military strength.129 Many ASEAN+6 members and their industries also 
cannot afford to have two expansive yet conflicting sets of regional trade 
and trade-related standards.130 At some point, they will have to decide 
whether they want to focus on one or the other.
6 Conclusion
Regardless of the intellectual property standards ultimately included in 
the RCEP Agreement, that agreement, if established, will have serious 
ramifications for future intellectual property norm-setting in the Asian 
Pacific region. These ramifications will be similar to those concerning 
the establishment of the TPP or the CPTPP. To some extent, the mega-
regional norm-setting exercises surrounding both the TPP/CPTPP and 
the RCEP reflect the ongoing policy dilemma confronting intellectual 
property policymakers in the region. If the protection and enforcement 
standards are set too low, the participating countries will have squandered 
a rare and valuable opportunity to promote regional harmonisation. If the 
standards are set too high, however, they will also have hurt themselves 
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by impeding future development, eroding global competitiveness 
and jeopardising access to essential medicines, educational materials and 
information technology.
To complicate matters even further, the TPP chapter, the chapter as 
modified by the CPTPP and the draft RCEP chapter all feature protection 
and enforcement standards that have already been widely accepted by the 
developed country members of the Asian Pacific region. Overemphasis on 
these standards can be problematic, as such emphasis could undermine 
the region’s ability to undertake the reform needed to target problems that 
are commonly found in developing countries. Indeed, except for those 
concerning the protection of genetic resources, traditional knowledge 
and traditional cultural expressions, none of the intellectual property 
provisions found in the TPP Agreement, the CPTPP or the draft RCEP 
chapter seem to target those specific problems.
As I have noted in previous works, developing countries in the Asian 
Pacific region continue to face a wide array of policy challenges, including 
a significant discrepancy between law on the books and enforcement on 
the ground; a woeful lack of access to essential medicines, educational 
materials, computer software, information technology, scientific and 
technical knowledge, and patented seeds and foodstuffs; and the growing 
need for alternative innovation models and other measures to address the 
highly uneven economic and technological developments within these 
countries.131 If the intellectual property chapters in the TPP Agreement, 
the CPTPP or the RCEP Agreement will not address these challenges, 
one has to wonder what other measures will have to be taken to eventually 
improve the intellectual property systems in the developing country 
members of the Asian Pacific region.
131  Yu ‘Intellectual Property and Asian Values’, above n 97, at 379–397.
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